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THE IMPENDING JUDICIAL REGULATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
© 2021 Aram A. Gavoor† 
I. Introduction 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms are being deployed in executive branch agencies at 
a brisk pace and with no executive branch account for their use.1  The Administrative Conference 
of the United States (ACUS), an independent federal research and recommendatory agency, has 
studied AI use in federal administrative agencies and observed in a report that little is known 
about how such algorithms are actually being used.2  This is significant because over sixty 
agencies have experimented with AI to enforce regulatory mandates, adjudicate government 
benefits and privileges, and draw information from large data streams for consumer complaints, 
among other uses.3  The proliferation of this new technology in government that has generally 
 
† Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington University Law School.  Thanks to Steve Platt for his 
helpful comments.  All errors are my own. 
1 David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, GOVERNMENT BY 
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (Feb. 2020), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. (Nearly 45% of federal agencies have used 
either AI or machine learning in some capacity, but only 12% of agencies were rated as being “high in 
sophistication” of use by computer science researchers at Stanford University). 
2 David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, GOVERNMENT BY 
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 6-7 (Feb. 2020), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. 
3 David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, GOVERNMENT BY 
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 6-7 (Feb. 2020), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. 
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been found to succumb to racial and gender biases4 when incompetently or intentionally5 trained 
to do so raises civil rights concerns.6 
Though the Obama and Trump administrations made efforts to address the responsible 
technological advancement of AI in government in broad strokes, there are currently no 
constraints on the procedures, if any, that agencies use to adopt AI in their administrative actions.  
In late 2016, the Obama Administration issued a report, Preparing for the Future of Artificial 
Intelligence,7 alongside the National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic 
Plan.8  The Trump Administration made progress in the federal response to AI development by 
taking preliminary steps in organizing and regulating AI systems being deployed by government 
agencies under two executive orders.9  Executive Order 13,859, Maintaining American 
Leadership in Artificial Intelligence and Executive Order 13,960, Promoting the Use of 
Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Federal Government, were the first presidential actions 
 
4 James Zou & Londa Schiebinger, AI Can Be Sexist and Racist—It’s Time to Make It Fair, 559 NATURE 324 
(2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05707-8; Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s 
Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 677 (2016); Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction (2016) 
(discussing how contrary to intuitive perception, mathematical models which in theory are designed to be more fair 
than human decision makers often reinforce bias and are also opaque, unregulated, and uncontestable). 
5 MIT Technology Review, Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning, Podcast: Playing the job market – AI hiring 
tools pose risks to workforce equality, interview of Keith Sonderling, Commission, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (July 21, 2021) https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/07/21/1029868/podcast-playing-the-job-
market-ai-hiring/.  
6 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,960, Executive Order on Promoting the Use of Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in 
the Federal Government (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/08/2020-
27065/promoting-the-use-oftrustworthy-artificial-intelligence-in-the-federal-government 
7 Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council, Comm. on Tech., Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_
future_of_ai.pdf (Oct. 2016). 
8 Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council, Comm. on Tech., National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic 
Plan (Oct. 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/national_ai_rd_stra
tegic_plan.pdf. 
9 Exec. Order No. 13,859, Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 3967 (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/14/2019-02544/maintaining-
americanleadership-in-artificial-intelligence; Exec. Order No. 13,960, Executive Order on Promoting the Use of 
Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Federal Government (Dec. 3, 2020), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/08/2020-27065/promoting-the-use-oftrustworthy-artificial-
intelligence-in-the-federal-government. 
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to be specifically focus on AI.  Together, they initiated a whole-of-government process to 
develop guidance for the regulation of AI applications at the macroscopic level.  That process is 
characteristically unhurried and not keeping pace to account for actuals in administrative 
implementations of AI in government. 
Policy solutions have been put forth to mitigate the issue of incompetent and 
irresponsible AI uses in government.  These include calls for legislation10 and the application of 
executive branch constraints that range from specific process changes in design and 
implementation of AI11 to those of a more structural nature.12  The question is when—rather than 
if—discrete solutions will be considered and adopted by the executive branch or Congress.  Such 
solutions are implied by Executive Orders in 13,859 and 13,960.13  Executive Order 13,859 
mandates the United States to drive technological breakthroughs in “Federal Government” and 
that the country must “foster public trust and confidence in AI technologies and protect civil 
liberties, privacy, and American values in their application.”14  Executive Order 13,960 lays out 
nine principles to which agencies should adhere when “designing, developing, acquiring, and 
using AI.”15  These executive orders are expected to remain unrevoked.16  The Biden 
Administration has been active in AI, especially in fostering AI research and integrating AI into 
 
10 S. 2551, AI TRAINING Act (117th Cong.) https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/2551/; H.R. 
2575 AI in Government Act of 2020 (116th Cong.) https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-
bill/2575/text.  
11 Ryan Calo and Danielle Keats Citron, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 70 EMORY L.J. 
797 (2021). 
12 Aram A. Gavoor and Raffi Teperdjian, A Structural Solution to Mitigating Artificial Intelligence Bias in 
Administrative Agencies, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 71 (2021). 
13 Executive Order 13960, Promoting the Use of Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Federal Government, 85 
Fed. Reg. 78939 (Dec. 3, 2020); Executive Order 13589, Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial 
Intelligence, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019). 
14 Executive Order 13589, Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 at Sec. 
1(a) and (d) (Feb. 11, 2019). 
15 Executive Order 13960, Promoting the Use of Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Federal Government, 85 
Fed. Reg. 78939 Sec. 3 (Dec. 3, 2020). 
16 John Frank Weaver, The Federal Government and Trustworthy AI, 4 THE JOURNAL OF ROBOTICS, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE & LAW 227 (2021). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931348
September 2021 Working Draft – 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION (forthcoming Jan. 2022) 
4 
 
the national security strategy.17  And yet, the government has not sufficiently delved into the 
nuance to establish procedures by which to satisfy its lofty mandates. 
In June 2021, the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce issued in draft proposal to identify and mitigate AI bias as a general matter.18  That 
same month, the Office of Science and Technology Policy of the White House and National 
Science Foundation formed a task force for AI research.19  Despite these gains, the political 
branches of the federal government have limited time to act before their primary policymaking 
authority is diluted or potentially ceded to the Judiciary.  This essay argues that in the absence of 
timely action of the Executive or Legislative branches to establish procedures to mitigate for 
administrative agency AI accountability gaps (like bias) and transparency gaps (like being 
understandable and traceable),20 the Judiciary may dictate such procedures via remands under the 
administrative record provision of the Administrative Procedure Act of 194621 as it first did 50 
years ago with informal adjudications.22 
II. The Overton Park Administrative Record Rule and Its Enduring Legacy 
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), the Supreme Court imposed upon 
agencies a requirement to establish procedures that would generate a contemporaneous record of 
 
17 E.g., Press Release, The Biden Administration Launches the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource 
Task Force, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 10, 2021) https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/06/10/the-
biden-administration-launches-the-national-artificial-intelligence-research-resource-task-force/; National Artificial 
Intelligence Initiative, https://www.AI.gov (Overseeing and implementing the United States National AI Strategy). 
18 U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute for Standards and Technology, Draft NIST Special Publication 
1270, A Proposal for Identifying and Managing Bias in Artificial Intelligence (June 20, 2021) 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.1270-
draft.pdf?_sm_au_=iHVbf0FFbP1SMrKRFcVTvKQkcK8MG; Executive Order 13589, Maintaining American 
Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 at Sec. 6(d) (Feb. 11, 2019). 
19 The White House, Press Release, The Biden Administration Launches the National Artificial Intelligence 
Research Resource Task Force (June 10, 2021), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-
updates/2021/06/10/the-biden-administration-launches-the-national-artificial-intelligence-research-resource-task-
force/.; William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, P.L. 116-283, Title 
LI, Sec. 5106. 
20 Cary Coglianese and David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2019). 
21 5 U.S.C. § 706 
22 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
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their informal adjudications so that courts could fulfil their judicial review duties.  Though 
informal adjudications account for the majority of actions that are reviewable under the APA,23 
the statute does not enumerate procedures for how agencies should go about with this class of 
action as it does for formal adjudication, informal rulemaking, and formal rulemaking.24  Upon 
remand in Overton Park, it took the agency four months to produce an informal adjudication 
“record.”25  By 1976, a quantitative study concluded that agencies coalesced on now-familiar 
procedures in their informal adjudications: (1) notice; (2) an opportunity to present data and 
arguments in oral or written format; (3) a decision by a neutral decisionmaker, and (4) a 
statement of reasons in support of the decision.26  Three years later, the Court enunciated the 
general principle that the Judiciary may not impose additional procedural requirements on 
agencies than those contained in the APA in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1974).27  Notwithstanding, it reinforced its Overton 
Park holding in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corporation in 1990.28  
In LTV, the Court described Overton Park as standing for the proposition that 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A), which requires courts to ensure “agency action is not arbitrary and capricious or 
otherwise contrary to law, imposes a general “procedural” requirement of sorts by mandating 
that an agency take whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that will enable the court to 
evaluate the agency’s rationale at the time of decision.”29  Applying that logic to the lack of 
transparency in administrative agency uses of AI algorithms and their troubling propensity for 
 
23 Kristine E. Hickman and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW at 345, Foundation Press (3d ed. 
2020). 
24 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417-19 (1971). 
25 Nathanial L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial 
Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1975). 
26 Paul Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1976). 
27 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1974) 
28 Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990); Aram A. Gavoor and Steven A. Platt, 
Administrative Records and the Courts, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2018). 
29 Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990). 
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bias, the executive branch may be soon face an Overton Park II moment.  The factual predicate 
for such an event is already in place. 
III. The Implementation of AI In the Administrative State Is Susceptible To Judicial 
Regulation Under The Administrative Record Rule. 
 
Authored by some of the most consequential minds in AI, the 2020 ACUS report, 
Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in in Federal Administrative Agencies (ACUS 
Report), is the first comprehensive account of how federal agencies are using AI systems.  The 
report canvassed the use of AI in 142 of the most significant departments, agencies, and sub-
agencies.30  It offered five findings: (1) the government’s AI toolkit is diverse with 45% of 
surveyed agencies (or 64 agencies) having experimented with AI and related machine learning 
tools; (2) despite wide agency embrace of AI, agencies do not use sophisticated techniques for 
AI; (3) AI poses “deep accountability challenges” in terms of transparency of processes and the 
integration of such processes into administrative law norms; (4) agencies need to develop 
internal technical capacity in AI; and (5) AI “has the potential to raise distributive concerns and 
fuel political anxieties.”31 
In 2020, at least 10 agencies have used AI in the course of adjudication.32  These include 
the Social Security Administration using AI tools in a variety of ways to improve decisional 
quality in disability benefits formal adjudication and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office using 
 
30 David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, GOVERNMENT BY 
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 6 (Feb. 2020), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. 
31 David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, GOVERNMENT BY 
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 6-7 (Feb. 2020), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. 
32 David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, GOVERNMENT BY 
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 17 (Feb. 2020), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. 
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AI to improve patent and mark classifications and prior patent or mark searches.33  Adding to the 
obfuscation to the ACUS-studied use cases, 53% of agencies surveyed developed their 
algorithms in-house without private contracting.34  And, 88% of agencies were unable or 
unwilling to articulate sufficient technical details to furnish the ACUS team of computer 
scientists to assign a basic low/medium/high sophistication standard on their AI use behavior.35  
These facts and others led the ACUS report authors to conclude that “algorithmic governance 
tools trigger a profound collision between administrative law’s requirement of transparency and 
reason-giving and the fact that many algorithmic decision tools are not, by their structure, fully 
explainable.”36  The authors’ aforementioned reference to “administrative law” pertained to 
procedural promulgation and substantive review under the arbitrary and capricious standard.  
They do not contemplate the risk associated with judicial regulation of administrative AI 
implementation as contemplated in this essay.  As aggrieved parties challenge adjudications that 
are empowered by AI algorithms that the agencies cannot adequately explain or trace, the 
common law that courts will develop as to AI-based administrative records will stand apart from 
normative common law development under arbitrary and capricious review or under the 
Chevron, Skidmore, or Kisor standards of judicial deference to agency interpretations of law. 
 
33 David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, GOVERNMENT BY 
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 36, 46-49 (Feb. 2020), 
https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. 
34 David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, GOVERNMENT BY 
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 18 (Feb. 2020), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. 
35 David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, GOVERNMENT BY 
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 20 (Feb. 2020), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. 
36 David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M. Sharkey, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, GOVERNMENT BY 
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 28 (Feb. 2020), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-Report.pdf. 
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Consider the following scenario that illustrates one of several ways in which the 
administrative record rule would result in cyclical remand-based regulation of administrative AI 
promulgation procedures and quality standards.   
In the course of APA litigation that involves an informal adjudication that is empowered 
by an unexplainable or untraceable AI (among other possible flaws), the agency would lodge 
with the court or serve upon opposing counsel what it deems as a complete and certified 
administrative record.  The plaintiff would then challenge the sufficiency of the record with open 
source, Freedom of Information Act-derived, or other information that evidences the agency’s 
use of AI to rebut the presumption of regularity that courts assign agency administrative records.  
In some circumstances, the plaintiff may simply point to the existence of AI in the agency’s 
adjudicative process as a basis to speculate that more records exist.  The court would side with 
the plaintiff over the government’s opposition papers and order the record to be “completed.”  
That order would come with an instruction for the agency to lay out with sufficient clarity for 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) arbitrary and capricious review the procedures that the agency used to 
“enable the court to evaluate the agency’s rationale at the time of decision.”37  The agency would 
fail to do comply with the court’s instruction because it lacks the technical ability to do so.  The 
agency might attempt to furnish the court with an affidavit or declaration from a sufficiently 
senior agency official to lay out the decision-making process and the role that the AI has within 
it.  The explanation would be in broad strokes and insufficiently specific to satisfy the court.  
And though the agency may move for relief the merits at this juncture,38 the court would enter a 
limited order for traditional deposition discovery and possibly require the agency to furnish 
under seal to the court an emulator that is loaded with the AI algorithm that assisted the 
 
37 Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990). 
38 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) or 56(a). 
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challenged adjudication for the court to consider on the merits.  As described, infra, the court 
could alternatively move directly to the merits and presumptively rule in favor of plaintiffs under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard because the agency cannot explain the result of its 
adjudication.39 
At this juncture, the government may consider granting underlying relief that plaintiff 
seeks to moot the case.  If the court concludes that the case is not moot on account of the 
voluntary cessation40 standard or another application of the mootness doctrine, the government 
will have multiple options at its disposal.  It could comply with the court’s discovery order, seek 
to defeat a potential contempt motion with the impossibility defense by declaring under perjury 
that the record is complete to its knowledge, move the court to certify an interlocutory appeal, or 
seek emergency mandamus relief with the appropriate Court of Appeals.  The government will 
likely lose an attempt at emergency relief because the case law on administrative records offers 
only a general bulwark to shield against the courts “inquiring into the mental processes of 
administrative decisionmakers.”41  Here, the administrative record completion that plaintiff seeks 
via traditional discovery relates to the agency’s algorithmic governance information that was not 
performed by a human. 
Regardless of the outcome, the agency will find itself facing a Hobson’s choice where it 
could find itself under internal management, political, and extrinsic pressure to either scrap the 
AI tool altogether, subordinate its influential effect on decision-making, or attempt to establish 
AI promulgation and transparency procedures that will satisfy the Overton Park standard of 
 
39 See infra at 10. 
40 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’tl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). 
41 Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2574 (2019) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (“we have recognized a narrow exception to the general rule against inquiring into 
“the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers” in the context of a bad faith showing) (cleaned up); Aram 
A. Gavoor and Steven A. Platt, Administrative Records After Department of Commerce, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 87, 98 
(2020). 
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generating a contemporaneous administrative record.  Macroscopically, this process of courts 
determining the suitability of AI promulgation and transparency procedures will repeat on a 
cyclical basis across agency and executive branch litigations.  From it, an AI administrative 
record common law will develop that is advanced by virtue of an absence of negative outcomes 
for the government.  Put another way, agency AI procedures that do not result in onerous 
administrative record discovery orders will be adopted across agencies in the place of those that 
do not meet the mark. 
Though AI record problems could arise in rulemaking and formal adjudication scenarios, 
especially where the agency decisionmaker expressly or in-effect cedes decisional authority to an 
algorithm, the existence of positive APA procedures for these classes of agency action should 
not significantly affect the evidence in litigation that challenges them.  Informal agency actions 
are striking different because the APA imposes no positive procedures on them, save for the 
basic duty to notify a private party of a completed adjudication under 5 U.S.C. § 555(e).  Similar 
to the 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) review of informal agency adjudications, the net effect of this 
cyclical behavior would be the judicial imposition of administrative law procedural norms for AI 
that dilute or outright exercise the policy-making authority of the executive branch or Congress.  
Depending on the wisdom of agencies’ AI implementations, the transparency and limiting 
principles that they put in place, this judicial process may be forestalled entirely if timely 
governmentwide AI implementation procedures are put into place by the executive branch.42 
 Stepping back from this predictive scenario, there remains an open question of whether 
the federal courts ought to be in a posture to wield in-effect policymaking authority over 
executive branch AI promulgation and transparency procedures through the exercise of 
 
42 E.g., Ashley Deeks, The Judicial Demand for Explainable Artificial Intelligence, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1829, 
1830-31 (2019); Aram A. Gavoor and Raffi Teperdjian, A Structural Solution to Mitigating Artificial Intelligence 
Bias in Administrative Agencies, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 71, 75 (2021) 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931348
September 2021 Working Draft – 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION (forthcoming Jan. 2022) 
11 
 
successive administrative record-insufficiency remands.  Though the Court did not address that 
question as it is framed, here, it reinforced and strengthened the Overton Park record rule in 
Department of Commerce v. New York.43  If a court were inclined to seek an alternative to 
remanding an insufficient administrative record to an agency for completion or ordering 
traditional discovery at great expense to the agency, it could set aside the underlying agency 
action on the merits.  Because an incomplete administrative record furnishes an insufficient body 
of facts to enable a jurist to draw a rational connection between the facts found and the decision 
made, the agency’s evidentiary flaw doubles as a merits problem.   
It is sometimes preferable for an agency to lose a case and have an opportunity to take a 
second bite at the apple then undergo a highly disruptive record completion or record 
supplementation order of the sort that encumbered the Department of Homeland Security in 
Trump-era Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) recission litigation.  In one such 
DACA case (in which AI was not implicated), 30,000 documents were ordered to be produced in 
a matter of days.  At oral argument, a government attorney reported: “[o]ne out of every 14 
[Immigration and Customs Enforcement] lawyers is devoted to considering the discovery 
requests in this case.  Every [Department of Homeland Security] litigation lawyer at [Department 
of Homeland Security] headquarters is considering the discovery requests in this case.  




43 Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573-74 (2019) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)). 
44 Josh Gerstein, Appeals Courts Block Access to DACA Cancellation Files, POLITICO (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/24/dreamers-daca-appeals-courts-access-244138 (quoting Civil Division 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hashim Mooppan). See, e.g., Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 295 F. Supp. 3d 127 
(E.D.N.Y. 2017); In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931348




 Notwithstanding the permutations and consequences of an eventual series of APA 
challenges that would place the federal courts in the posture of cyclical administrative record 
remands on AI-based adjudications, sound public policy dictates that the executive branch at 
minimum should expressly and publicly begin the process of enunciating both discrete 
procedures and limiting principles for AI use in administrative agencies.  Such a process, itself, 
could go a long way to earning judicial stays in contentious litigations until the procedures can 
be adequately developed in the interest of continuity of government operations.  Having draft 
procedures publicly available, or better yet, available for public comment could also serve as a 
guidepost for courts to fashion orders with indirect governmental policy input.  In litigation, the 
government could rely on such draft procedures in problem-case discovery proposals.  Until such 
advances have materialized, the clock is ticking on the federal government’s ability to 
methodically determine AI procedural implementation policy under its own terms. 
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